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INTRODUCTION
1

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or “Act”),
was enacted in the wake of vast stock market declines and
congressional investigations of widespread financial misstatements
and other misconduct in American corporations and in American
capital markets. In many ways, the Act is the most comprehensive
legislation to impact the federal securities laws since the 1930s.
Senate Report No. 107-205, which accompanied the Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation, stated:
The purpose of the bill [S. 2673, which largely comprised
the Act] is to address the systemic and structural weaknesses
affecting our capital markets which were revealed by repeated
failures of audit effectiveness and corporate financial and brokerdealer responsibility in recent months and years. The bill creates
a strong independent board to oversee the conduct of the
auditors of public companies, and it strengthens auditor
independence from corporate management by limiting the scope
of non-audit services that auditors can offer their public company
audit clients. . . .
The bill also requires steps to enhance the direct
responsibility of senior corporate management for financial
reporting and for the quality of financial disclosures made by
∗
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public companies. The bill establishes clear statutory rules to
limit, and expose to public view, possible conflicts of interest
affecting securities analysts.
Finally, the bill authorizes
substantially higher funding for the Securities and Exchange
2
Commission.

The Act also provides that company audit committees are
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the
work of their auditors. The independence of company audit
committees is strengthened by prohibiting committee members from
accepting consulting fees from the company and by barring
committee members from being affiliated persons of the company
other than in their capacity as board members. The Act prohibits
insider trades during pension blackout periods, requires prompt
disclosure of insider trades in company stock, lengthens the
limitations period for securities fraud actions, establishes a new
federal crime of securities fraud, and enacts into law a number of
other provisions designed “to protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
3
securities laws.”
While the Act contains a number of provisions expressly
granting private parties the right to sue for violations of the Act, there
is an important question as to whether or not private actions may be
implied under certain provisions of the Act. In other words, should
the courts imply private rights of action where such rights have not
been granted expressly by the Act? Conceptually, such implied
private actions could be based upon specific existing provisions of the
federal securities laws which already sustain implied private actions,
such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act” or
4
5
6
“SEA”) section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 or SEA section 14(a) and Rule
7
14a-9; or such implied private actions could rest solely upon the new
statutory provisions of the Act.
We will address the state of the existing law with respect to
implying private actions under the federal securities laws, the
legislative history of the Act as this legislative history addresses
implying private actions under the Act, and, most important, the
specific language of the Act itself as that language relates to the issue
2
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of implying private actions under the Act. We will also examine SEC
rules and releases promulgated pursuant to the Act, focusing upon
the issue of implied liabilities.
BACKGROUND
The expansion and contraction of the application of the concept
of implying private actions under the federal securities laws and
certain other statutes has been examined elsewhere in considerable
8
detail. In this Section, we will focus briefly upon the high points of
that analysis in order to establish the framework for the proper
approach to implied private actions under the Act.
9
In Cort v. Ash, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a stockholder’s
implied action against directors for violation of a criminal statute that
prohibited corporate expenditures in campaigns for federal office. A
unanimous Court, per Mr. Justice Brennan, stated:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant.
First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit
10
the statute was enacted”[ ]—that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
11
such a remedy or to deny one?[ ] Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
12
remedy for the plaintiff?[ ] And finally, is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
13
cause of action based solely on federal law?

Four years after Cort, the High Court changed direction, and in a
14
6-3 decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago, implied a private right
of action under section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination by
universities receiving federal financial assistance. The action had
8
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11
Id. (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974)).
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Id. (citing Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423 (1975); Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 414 U.S. 453; Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964)).
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Id. (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 394, 395 (1971); id. at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963)).
14
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been brought by a female who was denied admission to medical
school at two private universities. For our purposes, however, the
most significant element in the Court’s opinion, as well as in the
concurring and dissenting opinions, was the emphasis upon the
importance of the second Cort factor—the legislative intent—in
comparison to Cort’s three other factors.
Cannon’s emphasis upon Cort’s second factor—legislative
intent—was reiterated later in the same year by the Supreme Court in
a leading case involving the federal securities laws. In Touche Ross &
15
Co. v. Redington, the High Court determined that a broker’s
customers had no implied action for damages against the broker’s
auditors for alleged misstatements contained in the reports required
16
under section 17(a) of the Exchange Act. The Court wrote:
It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it
considered “relevant” in determining whether a private remedy is
implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court
did not decide that each of these factors is entitled to equal
weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended
to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of
action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort—the
language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its
purpose—are ones traditionally relied upon in determining
legislative intent. Here, the statute by its terms grants no private
rights to any identifiable class and proscribes no conduct as
unlawful. And the parties as well as the Court of Appeals agree
that the legislative history of the 1934 Act simply does not speak
to the issue of private remedies under § 17(a). At least in such a
case as this, the inquiry ends there: The question whether
Congress, either expressly or by implication, intended to create a
private right of action, has been definitely answered in the
17
negative.

Redington’s focus upon legislative intent as manifested in the
language and terms of the statute and to a lesser degree in the
legislative history was reemphasized in the Supreme Court’s 1994
18
decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver. In
Central Bank, the High Court refused to imply a private right of action
for aiding and abetting securities fraud under SEA section 10(b).
The Court’s analysis concentrated almost exclusively upon the text of
the statute.
15
16
17
18

442 U.S. 566 (1979).
15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (2000).
Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-76 (internal citation omitted).
511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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We have refused to allow 10b-5 challenges to conduct not
prohibited by the text of the statute.
....
Adherence to the text in defining the conduct covered by §
10(b) is consistent with our decisions interpreting other
provisions of the securities Acts. In Pinter v. Dahl, for example, we
interpreted the word “seller” in § 12(1) of the 1933 Act by
“looking first at the language of § 12(1).” Ruling that a seller is
one who solicits securities sales for financial gain, we rejected the
broader contention, “grounded in tort doctrine,” that persons
who participate in the sale can also be deemed sellers. We found
“no support in the statutory language or legislative history for
expansion of § 12(1),” and stated that “[t]he ascertainment of
congressional intent with respect to the scope of liability created
by a particular section of the Securities Act must rest primarily on
the language of that section.”
....
Our consideration of statutory duties, especially in cases
interpreting § 10(b), establishes that the statutory text controls
19
the definition of conduct covered by § 10(b).

Our conclusion from the above discussion is that the existence
or non-existence of implied private actions under specific provisions
of Sarbanes-Oxley must be determined by reference to the legislative
intent. And legislative intent is determined primarily through an
analysis of the text and language of the statute and to a lesser degree
through an analysis of the statute’s legislative history and purpose.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
For reasons of organization and clarity, it is now appropriate to
address the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley. We will address the
text and language of the statute in subsequent sections. This
legislative history roughly divides itself into three phases, and a
reasonable conclusion after analysis of these phases is that this
legislative history is not supportive of implied private actions under
the Act.
The first phase of the legislative history is seen in the hearings
on February 4-5, 2002 of the House Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the
House Committee on Financial Services.
In these hearings
Representative Christopher Cox of California, who had been one of

19

Id. at 173-75 (internal citations omitted).
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the most avid and vocal proponents of the Private Securities
20
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), moved swiftly to forestall
any attempt to roll back this essentially pro-defendant legislation by
spinning it as pro-plaintiff. Mr. Cox stated:
I am also very pleased as we meet here today that as we try
and pick up the pieces, as the victims of the Enron debacle try
through both civil and ultimately criminal proceedings to gain
vindication, that we can rely upon the very pro-shareholder
legislation that this Congress enacted some years ago in the form
of the Securities Litigation Reform Act, because many of the
Members of this subcommittee, given our change in jurisdiction
in the Congress, were not present at the birthing and the drafting
of that legislation. I just want to bring to the Members’ attention
some of what it is going to do for the shareholders of Enron who
are now seeking vindication. In the old days it used to be that the
first lawyers to the courthouse got to represent you in a class
action. We ended that abuse. We ended that process and now
the court is going to pick the best class representative.
The Securities Litigation Reform Act gives the court the
power to review unconscionable attorneys fees so that the
recoveries for abused shareholders will be greater. It imposed
new responsibilities on auditors to detect and report illegal acts.
It eliminated the professional plaintiffs that used to victimize
shareholders in fraudulent and extortionate lawsuits.
It
strengthened the conflict of interest rules relating to attorneys,
ensuring that shareholders are going to get fair representation.
. . .[T]he Securities Litigation Reform Act broadened the
SEC’s aiding and abetting enforcement authority, strengthening
the ability of the Commission to prosecute those who aid and abet
violations of our securities laws.
I also wanted to point out, in conclusion, that far from
making it more difficult to bring these kinds of lawsuits, it seems
to have advantaged meritorious cases. In the 5 years preceding
the enactment of the Securities Litigation Reform Act the average
number of securities laws fraud suits filed in our Federal courts
was 189. That’s increased now 250 percent, so that for 2001 the
actual number of cases filed was 486, and the average settlements
have gone way up . . . so that shareholders are getting more as a
21
result of these important reforms.

20

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
21
The Enron Collapse: Implications to Investors and the Capital Markets: Hearings on
H.R. 3763 Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored
Enterprises of the House Committee on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2002),
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Representative Cox’s efforts to prevent any weakening of the
provisions of the PSLRA were supported by statements from the
American Enterprise Institute, the Securities Industry Association, the
Financial Executives International, and others. These supporting
statements were made at the outset of the hearings on March 13,
March 20, and April 9, 2002, before the full House Committee on
Financial Services, which was addressing House Bill 3763, the
Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and
Transparency Act of 2002. House Bill 3763, together with Senate Bill
2673, was subsequently enacted as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
At this second set of House hearings, however, a second phase of
legislative history with respect to Sarbanes-Oxley emerged in the
forceful statements of Representatives John La Falce of New York,
Melvin Watt of North Carolina, and Brad Sherman of California
supporting the enhancement of the rights of private litigants to
enforce the securities laws. Representative Watt clearly articulated
this position.
So one of the things I particularly feel strongly about is that
there is a very important role for private litigants to enforce rights
in this context. We can’t give responsibility solely to the SEC and
say you have got absolute authority to do this, and if you don’t do
it, then nobody is going to have the authority to do it. Our whole
accountability system in this country is based on the rights of
individuals to hold corporations and other individuals
accountable when they feel like they have been wronged. So, at a
minimum, we need to put some of those provisions in the bill to
provide for private litigants to protect their own rights, and that I
22
think is a hallmark of the way our system should work.

The majority of the legislators who passed Sarbanes-Oxley,
however, did not accept this position articulated by Representative
Watt. The third and final phase of the congressional debates
regarding Sarbanes-Oxley appeared to militate against the expansion
of implied private actions under the Act. This interpretation is
supported by the statements of a number of Congressmen on July 25,
2002 during the debate on the conference report on House Bill 3763,
a report which essentially comprised the Act.
Representative Watt and others, who had championed the
enhancement of the rights of private litigants under the Act and who
were now faced with a fait accompli in the final version of the Act,

available
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba77683.000/
hba77683_0f.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
22
Id.
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made resigned statements emphasizing the need for future studies
regarding civil actions, and stressing that the Act was really “just the
23
first step.” Their conclusion appeared to be that the final version of
the Act, whatever else it accomplished, did not do enough to
enhance the rights of private plaintiffs in civil litigation.
Representative Watt spoke to the need for additional studies, stating:
Let me applaud the chair and ranking member of the House
Committee on Financial Services for the job they did starting the
process. We had a bill that was a reasonable start, that has been
significantly improved upon during the course of the conference,
and one of the things that the bill does is ratchet up criminal
penalties, but I want to take some time to say that I am not sure
that just ratcheting up criminal penalties will do the job.
But there are some things in the conference report which
require us and the SEC and GAO to do additional studies and
report back to the committees of jurisdiction about either
regulatory action that is recommended or legislative action that is
recommended, and one of those things is an SEC study of
violations and violators and whether we have undermined the
ability of individuals to bring claims in civil court to enforce their
rights and protect their status as investors.
I do not want to overlook some of those studies that will be
reporting back to us because I think this bill is really just the first
24
step, and I applaud us for making that step.

Representative Carson of Indiana stated:
The Conference bill before us today provides the absolute
minimum protections to protect investors and restore market
confidence.
Still, this measure could be stronger and certainly disgorging
the ill gotten gains of these criminals and redistributing profits to
the victims must be the next step.
We hear frequently that there is little that Congress should
do and limit our interference. However, Congress’ passage of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 got us to where
we are today. It repealed the civil RICO, thereby preventing
defrauded investors from obtaining triple damages when they
bring securities fraud claims.
Mr. Speaker, if we are to restore market confidence, and
investors and workers are to be made whole, Congress must pass a
strong bill that sets penalties, protects whistleblowers, sends

23
24
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wrongdoers to jail, and ensures transparency.
Assets acquired through fraud and betrayal of confidence
should not be allowed to stand when countless Americans close to
retirement must now rethink how they will downgrade their
25
retired lives.

Representative Conyers of Michigan emphasized:
As good as this bill is, it’s important to note that the
agreement is just a first step toward protecting American investors
and workers. We still need to fix the many, many giveaways
enacted by Congress in the 1995 Securities Litigation bill. For
example, we need to restore civil liability against those that aid
and abet securities fraud violators, and make sure that civil RICO
applies in full to securities fraud. Measures such as this will make
it abundantly clear that we will not tolerate future Enron or
26
WorldCom situations.

Representative Tiahrt of Kansas concluded:
One important area which this bill does not address is the
issue of returning ill-gotten corporate gains to investors. I believe
Congress must act to ensure that investors are able to reclaim
27
their losses which are due to corporate fraud.

THE TEXT OF SARBANES-OXLEY
We concluded above that the U.S. Supreme Court has mandated
that the existence or non-existence of implied private actions under
Sarbanes-Oxley must be determined by reference to the legislative
intent. And legislative intent is determined primarily through an
analysis of the text and language of the statute and to a lesser degree
through an analysis of the statute’s legislative history. We also
concluded that the legislative history is not supportive of implied
private actions under Sarbanes-Oxley.
We now turn to an analysis of the text and language of certain
provisions of the statute. Certain provisions by their terms clearly
reject the implication of private actions.
Other provisions
inferentially reject the implication of private actions. Still other
provisions are less clear in such a rejection, but the impact and thrust
of the text is toward rejection of implied private actions. We will
commence our analysis with those provisions which clearly reject the
implication of private actions, and move across the spectrum to those
provisions which are less clear in their rejection.
25
26
27

Id. at H5470.
Id. at H5478.
Id.
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There are two additional considerations which are embedded in
our analysis. First, any private actions implied under Sarbanes-Oxley
may be based upon specific existing provisions of the federal
securities laws, which already sustain implied private actions, such as
SEA section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; alternatively, such implied private
actions may rest solely upon the new statutory provisions of SarbanesOxley. Second, what weight should be given to SEC releases and
rules promulgated under specific provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley after
the enactment of the statute? In some instances, such as with respect
to the professional conduct of lawyers, the Commission has been
careful specifically to reject any creation of implied private actions.
28
In other instances, such as new Regulation G addressing pro forma
financial statements, the Commission has opined that violations of
Regulation G may also be violations of SEA section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.
SPECIFIC STATUTORY REJECTION OF IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS
29

Section 804 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the new statute of limitations
for securities fraud, states clearly and unequivocally:
(c) NO CREATION OF ACTIONS.—Nothing in this section shall
30
create a new, private right of action.

While this statutory language is clear, simple, and unambiguous, the
complete section 804 raises complex questions regarding implied
private actions.
Section 804(a) of the Act amends 28 U.S.C. § 1658, which now
reads in full:
Section 1658—Time limitations on the commencement of civil
actions arising under Acts of Congress
(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising
under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment
of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the
cause of action accrues.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right of action
that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or
contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement
concerning the securities laws, as defined in section 3(a)(47) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)), may be
brought not later than the earlier of—

28
29
30

17 C.F.R. §§ 244.100-.102 (2003).
28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2003).
Id.
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(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting
the violation; or
31

(2) 5 years after such violation.

In addition to amending 28 U.S.C. § 1658, section 804 further
provides:
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The limitations period provided by
section 1658(b) of title 28, United States Code, as added by this
section, shall apply to all proceedings addressed by this section
that are commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act.
(c) NO CREATION OF ACTIONS.—Nothing in this section
32
shall create a new, private right of action.

There may be a certain conflict among the sections quoted
above. Generally speaking, section 804 extends the pre-SarbanesOxley statutes of limitations applicable to claims of fraud under the
federal securities laws from one year after the discovery of the facts
constituting the violation but no more than three years after the
violation, to two years after discovery but no more than five years after
the violation. In addition, section 804 applies to all fraud claims
under the federal securities laws commenced after the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley. Thus, for example, a securities fraud claim which
accrued four years prior to the enactment of the statute and was
therefore barred at the time of enactment by the three year preenactment statute of limitations, could be revived and commenced
after enactment unless such revival is deemed to “create a new,
private right of action” under 804(c).
Another example of clear statutory rejection of implied private
33
actions under Sarbanes-Oxley appears in section 303, which
prohibits improper influence on the conduct of audits. Section
303(b) states unequivocally:
ENFORCEMENT.—In any civil proceeding, the Commission shall
have exclusive authority to enforce this section and any rule or
34
regulation issued under this section.

While the above language is clear and unambiguous, the full
section may raise questions with respect to implied private actions.
Section 303 states in full:
(a) RULES TO PROHIBIT.—It shall be unlawful, in
contravention of such rules or regulations as the Commission
31

Id.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745, 801
(2002).
33
15 U.S.C. § 7242(b) (2003).
34
Id.
32
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shall prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors, for any officer or director of an
issuer, or any other person acting under the direction thereof, to
take any action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or
mislead any independent public or certified accountant engaged
in the performance of an audit of the financial statements of that
issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial statements
materially misleading.
(b) ENFORCEMENT.—In any civil proceeding, the
Commission shall have exclusive authority to enforce this section
and any rule or regulation issued under this section.
(c) NO PREEMPTION OF OTHER LAW.—The provisions
of subsection (a) shall be in addition to, and shall not supercede
or preempt, any other provision of law or any rule or regulation
issued thereunder.
(d) DEADLINE FOR RULEMAKING.—The Commission
shall—
(1) propose the rules or regulations required by this
section, not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this
Act; and
(2) issue final rules or regulations required by this
35
section, not later than 270 days after that date of enactment.

While the SEC may have exclusive authority to enforce this
section under subsection (b) above, subsection (c) would appear to
allow a private party to initiate an implied private action based upon
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to seek redress for conduct
denominated as fraudulently manipulative or misleading under
subsection (a).
There are two additional points worth noting in addressing
specific statutory rejections of implied private actions under
Sarbanes-Oxley.
First, section 409, which requires real-time
disclosure by issuers of material changes in operations, initially
provided that only the SEC could enforce section 409 in a civil
36
action. The Sarbanes-Oxley Conference Committee, however, chose
to drop this requirement prior to the statute’s enactment. Second,
section 305 provides that in any action initiated by the SEC “the
Commission may seek, and any federal court may grant, any equitable
relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of

35
36

Id.
Id. § 78m.
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37

investors.” Since this provision would appear to cover financial, as
well as other redress, it adds additional strength to the argument that
implied private actions are not necessary to make investors whole
under Sarbanes-Oxley.
EXPRESS ACTIONS NEGATE IMPLIED ACTIONS
Moving across the spectrum from sections 804 and 303 of
Sarbanes-Oxley, which by their specific terms reject implied private
actions, we address two statutory sections of the Act that provide for
express private actions in the event of their violation. The clear
inference from the provision of an express statutory private action for
the violation of a particular section of the Act is the negation of an
implied private action for a violation of that same section.
Section 306 of Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits the directors and
executive officers of an issuer from purchasing or selling any equity
security of the issuer during a pension plan blackout period that
temporarily prevents plan participants from engaging in equity
38
securities transactions through their plan accounts.
These
restrictions apply if the director or executive officer acquired his
security in connection with his services as a director or executive
officer. If this prohibition is violated, the statute specifically provides:
(2) REMEDY.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Any profit realized by a director or
executive officer referred to in paragraph (1) from any purchase,
sale, or other acquisition or transfer in violation of this subsection
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such director or executive officer in
entering into the transaction.
(B) ACTIONS TO RECOVER PROFITS.—An action to
recover profits in accordance with this subsection may be
instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the
issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer fails or
refuses to bring such action within 60 days after the date of
request, or fails diligently to prosecute the action thereafter,
except that no such suit shall be brought more than 2 years after
39
the date on which such profit was realized.

In addition to the express statutory text, Exchange Act Release No.

37
38
39

Id. § 78u(d)(5).
Id. § 7244.
15 U.S.C. § 7244.
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40

34-47225, which promulgated rules under section 306, gives no hint
of any authorization for an implied private action.
Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley provides federal protection to
employees of public companies when they act lawfully to disclose
41
information about fraudulent activities within their company. If the
employer does take illegal action against the whistleblower in
retaliation for lawful and protected conduct, section 806 specifically
authorizes the whistleblower to file a complaint with the Department
of Labor. If the Department does not resolve the matter within 180
days, the whistleblower is authorized to commence an action in
federal court. Section 806 specifically sets out the procedure that a
whistleblower must follow to institute a federal action, the burden of
proof, the statute of limitations, and the permissible damages.
As with respect to section 303 discussed above, however, section
806(d) provides:
(d) RIGHTS RETAINED BY EMPLOYEE.—Nothing in this
section shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or
remedies of any employee under any Federal or State law, or
42
under any collective bargaining agreement.

Arguably, this provision may authorize an implied private action
under state or federal law for conduct violative of section 806 when
such conduct also violates other laws.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS ADVERSELY IMPACTING IMPLIED
PRIVATE ACTIONS
Continuing our move across the spectrum from statutory
provisions of the Act which by their specific terms reject implied
private actions, to statutory provisions which provide for express
private actions thereby inferentially negating implied private actions,
we now address statutory provisions whose thrust and impact is
against implied private actions.
Perhaps the most fundamental reform introduced by SarbanesOxley is the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board. The Board is carefully organized to be both independent of
the accounting industry and subject to supervision by the SEC.
Congress provided funding for the Board by imposing fees on public
companies and granted the Board broad powers to set auditing,
quality control, and ethical standards for accounting firms that audit
40

Insider Trades During Blackout Periods, Exchange Act Release No. 47225,
[2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) ¶ 86,817 (Jan. 22, 2003).
41
18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2003).
42
Id.
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public companies. In addition, under the Act, the Board has
authority to inspect, investigate, and bring disciplinary proceedings
against these accounting firms.
As part of its responsibilities, the Board is directed to conduct a
continuing program of inspections of registered public accounting
firms to assess the degree of compliance by these firms with the Act,
the rules of the SEC and the Board, and professional standards in
connection with the performance of audits and related matters
involving issuers. The Board is directed to prepare a written report of
its findings for each inspection and make this report available to the
public,
except that no portions of the inspection report that deal with
criticisms of or potential defects in the quality control systems of
the firm under inspection shall be made public if those criticisms
or defects are addressed by the firm, to the satisfaction of the
Board, not later than 12 months after the date of the inspection
43
report.

The thrust and impact of this rather unusual provision will be adverse
to the initiation and prosecution of implied private actions because it
will deny to plaintiffs’ lawyers the very type of official findings adverse
to accounting firms which are the lifeblood of their lawsuits.
Another provision of the Act dealing with accounting firms
whose thrust and impact is against implied private actions is section
106(a)(1), which states:
(a) APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN FOREIGN FIRMS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Any foreign public accounting firm
that prepares or furnishes an audit report with respect to any
issuer, shall be subject to this Act and the rules of the Board and
the Commission issued under this Act, in the same manner and to
the same extent as a public accounting firm that is organized and
operates under the laws of the United States or any State, except
that registration pursuant to section 102 shall not by itself provide a basis
for subjecting such a foreign public accounting firm to the jurisdiction of
the Federal or State courts, other than with respect to controversies between
44
such firms and the Board.

Since almost all lawsuits asserting implied private actions under the
federal securities laws are based upon provisions of the Exchange Act,
most particularly section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and since, under
section 27 of the Exchange Act, the federal courts have exclusive

43
44

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 104(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7214(g)(2) (2003).
Id. § 7216(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction of these implied private actions, section 106(a)(1) of
Sarbanes-Oxley with its limitations upon jurisdiction will make it
substantially more difficult to initiate implied private actions against
foreign accounting firms.
SEC RULES AND RELEASES
In the absence of further manifestations of legislative intent
regarding implied private actions in the language and text of specific
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, we will now address certain SEC rules
and releases promulgated under this statute. Clearly, these rules and
releases differ from the legislative history and the text of the statute
analyzed above because these rules and releases were promulgated
after, not before, the enactment of the statute. Therefore, these SEC
pronouncements do not constitute manifestations of legislative
intent. Rather, they express the SEC’s interpretations of legislative
intent or, more realistically, what the agency wants the world to
believe was the legislative intent. However, as the federal agency with
the most direct statutory mandate to protect the investing public
through the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the
federal securities laws, which now include Sarbanes-Oxley, the
agency’s interpretations of this statute are entitled to substantial
analysis and to substantial weight.
As in our analysis of the text of Sarbanes-Oxley, we will first
address those SEC rules and releases which clearly reject the
implication of private actions, and then move across the spectrum to
address those SEC rules and releases which in one instance straddle
the issue and in three other instances appear to support implied
private actions.
IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS
Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley provides rules of professional
responsibility for attorneys.
Section
307.—RULES
OF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ATTORNEYS.

PROFESSIONAL

Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the
Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the
protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing
before the Commission in any way in the representation of
issuers, including a rule—

45

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000).
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(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a
material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or
similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief
legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company (or the
equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately
respond to the evidence (adopting, as necessary, appropriate
remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation),
requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit
committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another
committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors
not employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board
46
of directors.

The text of the statute is silent regarding implied private actions.
47
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act” or “SA”) Release No. 8150,
however, which proposed a rule pursuant to section 307 that would
establish standards of professional conduct for attorneys, was
unequivocal in its rejection of implied private actions. The SEC
release invoked legislative history to buttress its position, stating:
The Commission notes that nothing in Section 307 creates a
private right of action against an attorney. Indeed, statements by
sponsors of the provision unequivocally demonstrate that there
was never an intention to create a right of action by third parties
for violation of the rule. Similarly, the Commission does not
intend that the provisions of Part 205 create any private right of
action against an attorney based on his or her compliance or non48
compliance with its provisions.

The SEC’s final release adopting the attorney responsibility rule
emphasized that it protected not only attorneys, but law firms and
issuers as well.
Section 205.7 No Private Right of Action
(a) Nothing in this part is intended to, or does, create a
private right of action against any attorney, law firm, or issuer
based upon compliance or noncompliance with its provisions.
(b) Authority to enforce compliance with this part is vested
46

15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2003).
Attorney Conduct Proposals, Securities Act Release No. 33-8150, [2002-2003
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,802, at 85,513 (Nov. 21, 2002).
48
Id. at 86,553 (footnote omitted) (citing 148 CONG. REC. S6552 (daily ed. July
10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards) (“Nothing in this bill gives anybody a right to
file a private lawsuit against anybody. The only people who can enforce this
amendment are the people at the SEC.”); 148 CONG. REC. S6555 (daily ed. July 10,
2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi) (“[T]his amendment creates a duty of professional
conduct and does not create a right of action by third parties.”)).
47
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exclusively in the Commission.
In the proposing release, the Commission expressed its view
that: “nothing in Section 307 creates a private right of action
against an attorney. . . . Similarly, the Commission does not
intend that the provisions of Part 205 create any private right of
action against an attorney based on his or her compliance or noncompliance with its provisions.” Nevertheless, the Commission
requested comments on whether it should provide in the final
rule “a ‘safe harbor’ from civil suits” for attorneys who comply
with the rule. Numerous commentators agreed that the final rule
should contain such a provision.
Several commentators suggested that the final rule contain a
safe harbor similar to that provided for auditors in Section 10A(c)
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(c), which provides that “[n]o
independent public accountant shall be liable in a private action
for any finding, conclusion, or statement expressed in a report” to
the Commission made by an issuer whose auditor has reported to
its board a failure to take remedial action. Other commentators
recommended that the Commission adopt language similar to
that in the Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers,
Standards of Care § 52, which provides that “[p]roof of a violation
of a rule or statute regulating the conduct of lawyers . . . does not
give rise to an implied cause of action for professional negligence
or breach of fiduciary duty. . . .” And others noted that the ABA
Model Rules, Scope, & 20, provides that “[v]iolation of a Rule
should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty
has been breached.” Finally, numerous other commentators were
of the view that a safe harbor should be created to protect lawyers
from liability where they have attempted in good faith to comply
with this part.
The Commission is persuaded that it is appropriate to
include an express safe harbor provision in the rule, which is set
forth in new Section 205.7, No Private Right of Action. Paragraph
(a) makes it clear that Part 205 does not create a private cause of
action against an attorney, a law firm or an issuer, based upon
their compliance or non-compliance with the part.
The
Commission is of the view that the protection of this provision
should extend to any entity that might be compelled to take
action under this part; thus it extends to law firms and issuers.
The Commission is also of the opinion that, for the safe harbor to
be truly effective, it must extend to both compliance and noncompliance under this part.
Paragraph (b) provides that only the Commission may
enforce the requirements of this part. The provision is intended

2004
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to preclude, among other things, private injunctive actions
seeking to compel persons to take actions under this part and
private damages actions against such persons. Once again, the
protection extends to all entities that have obligations under this
49
part.

IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS AGAINST AUDIT COMMITTEE
FINANCIAL EXPERTS
Section 407 of Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes rules with respect to
“audit committee financial experts.”
Section 407. DISCLOSURE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE
FINANCIAL EXPERT.
(a) RULES DEFINING “FINANCIAL EXPERT”.—The
Commission shall issue rules, as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest and consistent with the protection of investors, to
require each issuer, together with periodic reports required
pursuant to section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons
therefore, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at
least 1 member who is a financial expert, as such term is defined
by the Commission.
(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In defining the term “financial
expert” for purposes of subsection (a), the Commission shall
consider whether a person has, through education and
experience as a public accountant or auditor or a principal
financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting officer of
an issuer, or from a position involving the performance of similar
functions—
(1)an understanding of generally accepted accounting
principals and financial statements;
(2)experience in—
(A) the preparation or auditing
statements of generally comparable issuers; and

of

financial

(B) the application of such principles in connection
with the accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves;
(3) experience with internal accounting controls; and
(4) an understanding of audit committee functions.
(c) DEADLINE FOR RULEMAKING. — The Commission

49

Attorney Conduct Proposals, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, [2002-2003
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,823, at 87,097-98 (Jan. 29, 2003)
(footnotes omitted).
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shall—
(1) propose rules to implement this section, not later
than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act; and
(2) issue final rules to implement this section, not later
50
than 180 days after that date of enactment.

The text of the statute is silent regarding implied private actions.
51
Securities Act Release No. 8177, however, which adopted the rules
authorized by section 407, created a safe harbor from liability for
audit committee financial experts.
5. Safe Harbor from Liability for Audit Committee Financial
Experts
Several commenters urged us to clarify that the designation
or identification of an audit committee financial expert will not
increase or decrease his or her duties, obligations or potential
liability as an audit committee member. A few recommended a
formal safe harbor from liability for audit committee financial
experts. Unlike the provisions of the Act that impose substantive
requirements,[FN34] the requirements contemplated by Section
407 are entirely disclosure-based. We find no support in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act or in related legislative history that Congress
intended to change the duties, obligations or liability of any audit
committee member, including the audit committee financial
expert, through this provision.
In the proposing release, we stated that we did not believe
that the mere designation of the audit committee financial expert
would impose a higher degree of individual responsibility or
obligation on that person. Nor did we intend for the designation
to decrease the duties and obligations of other audit committee
members or the board of directors. We continue to believe that it
would adversely affect the operation of the audit committee and
its vital role in our financial reporting and public disclosure
system, and systems of corporate governance more generally, if
courts were to conclude that the designation and public
identification of an audit committee financial expert affected
such person’s duties, obligations or liability as an audit committee
member or board member. We find that it would be adverse to
the interests of investors and to the operation of markets and
therefore would not be in the public interest, if the designation
and identification affected the duties, obligations or liabilities to
which any member of the company’s audit committee or board is

50

15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2003).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 33-8177, [2002-2003
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,818, at 86,883 (Jan. 23, 2003).
51
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subject. To codify this position, we are including a safe harbor in
the new audit committee disclosure item to clarify that:
•

A person who is determined to be an audit committee
financial expert will not be deemed an “expert” for any
purpose, including without limitation for purposes of
Section 11 of the Securities Act, as a result of being
designated or identified as an audit committee financial
expert pursuant to the new disclosure item;

•

The designation or identification of a person as an
audit committee financial expert pursuant to the new
disclosure item does not impose on such person any
duties, obligations or liability that are greater than the
duties, obligations and liability imposed on such person
as a member of the audit committee and board of
directors in the absence of such designation or
identification; and

•

The designation or identification of a person as an
audit committee financial expert pursuant to the new
disclosure item does not affect the duties, obligations or
liability of any other member of the audit committee or
board of directors.

This safe harbor clarifies that any information in a
registration statement reviewed by the audit committee financial
expert is not “expertised” unless such person is acting in the
capacity of some other type of traditionally recognized expert.
Similarly, because the audit committee financial expert is not an
expert for purposes of Section 11, he or she is not subject to a
higher level of due diligence with respect to any portion of the
registration statement as a result of his or her designation or
identification as an audit committee financial expert.
In adopting this safe harbor, we wish to emphasize that all
directors bear significant responsibility. State law generally
imposes a fiduciary duty upon directors to protect the interests of
a company’s shareholders. This duty requires a director to
inform himself or herself of relevant facts and to use a “critical
52
eye” in assessing information prior to acting on a matter.[ ] Our
new rule provides that whether a person is, or is not, an audit
committee financial expert does not alter his or her duties,
obligations or liabilities. We believe this should be the case under
federal and state law.
[FN34] For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the
Commission to direct the self-regulatory organizations by rule to
52

See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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mandate the independence of all audit committee members of
companies listed on national securities exchanges and
associations. See Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. As
another example, Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits
certain loans made by companies to their directors and executive
53
officers.

There are two points in the above excerpt which bear on the
issue of implied private actions under Sarbanes-Oxley. First, the SEC
makes the distinction between provisions of the Act that impose
“substantive requirements,” which, according to the Commission in
footnote thirty-four of the above quote, include prohibitions of
certain loans by companies to insiders and self-regulatory rules
mandating the independence of all audit committee members, as
contrasted to the provisions of section 407 which, according to the
Commission in the first paragraph of the above excerpt, are “entirely
disclosure-based.” The Commission then opines that Congress did
not intend “to change the duties, obligations or liability of any audit
committee members, including the audit committee financial expert,
through [section 407].” The implication appears to be that Congress
did intend to change certain existing duties, obligations, and
liabilities through the imposition of the “substantive requirements” of
the Act. In the absence of express liabilities, one way to effectuate
this change would be through the creation of implied liabilities for
violations of these newly imposed “substantive requirements” of the
Act.
The second point in the quoted excerpt which bears on the issue
of implied private actions under Sarbanes-Oxley is that the SEC’s safe
harbor purports to protect the “audit committee financial expert”
from liabilities not only under federal law but under state law as well.
Query as to whether the SEC, as contrasted to the U.S. Congress, has
the power to grant absolution from liabilities under state law.
IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS BASED UPON DISCLOSURE
OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET TRANSACTIONS
Section 401(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley mandates disclosure with
respect to off-balance sheet transactions.
(j) OFF-BALANCE SHEET TRANSACTIONS.—Not later
than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, the Commission shall issue final rules providing that
53

Sarbanes-Oxley Act Disclosures, supra note 51, at 86,893-94 & n.34 (footnotes
omitted).
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each annual and quarterly financial report required to be filed
with the Commission shall disclose all material off-balance sheet
transactions, arrangements, obligations (including contingent
obligations), and other relationships of the issuer with
unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a material
current or future effect on financial condition, changes in
financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital
expenditures, capital resources, or significant components of
54
revenues or expenses.

Here again, as with respect to lawyers and audit committee
financial experts discussed above, the text of the statute is silent
55
regarding implied private actions. Securities Act Release No. 8182,
however, which adopted the rules authorized by section 401(a),
created “a new safe harbor” to “protect forward-looking statements
against private legal actions that are based on allegations of a material
56
misstatement or omission.” The SEC appears to have designed its
rule amendments to have a coverage and impact beyond the existing
57
statutory safe harbors contained in Securities Act section 27A and
58
Exchange Act section 21E. The Commission emphasized in Release
8182, which created the new safe harbor via rule amendments:
Because we believe that it would promote more meaningful
disclosure, we are invoking rulemaking authority under Sections
[SA]27A and [SEA]21E to create a new safe harbor to ensure the
application of the statutory safe harbors to the forward-looking
statements required under the amendments [to SEC rules
adopted by this Release]. The safe harbor is designed to remove
possible ambiguity about whether the statutory safe harbors would
apply to the forward-looking statements made in response to the
amendments. The safe harbor specifies that, except for historical
facts, the disclosure would be deemed to be a “forward looking
statement” as that term is defined in the statutory safe harbors. In
addition, with respect to the MD&A discussion of off-balance
sheet arrangements, we are adopting a provision that the
“meaningful cautionary statements” element of the statutory safe
harbors will be satisfied if a registrant satisfies all of its off-balance
sheet arrangements disclosure requirements. Because the new
MD&A safe harbor is closely linked to the statutory safe harbors,
we urge companies preparing their disclosure to consider the

54

15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (2003).
Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Securities Act Release No. 33-8182, [20022003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,821, at 86,969 (Jan. 28, 2003).
56
Id. at 86,985-86.
57
15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2003).
58
Id. § 78u-5.
55
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terms, conditions and scope of the statutory safe harbors in
59
drafting their disclosure.

IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS BASED UPON ANALYSTS’ CERTIFICATIONS
Moving across the spectrum from those SEC rules and releases
which provide specific safe-harbor protection from implied private
actions under provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley for lawyers, audit
committee financial experts, and with respect to off-balance
transactions, we now address the SEC’s attempt to straddle the issue
of implied private actions with respect to research analysts’
60
certifications in new Regulation AC.
Section 501(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes the SEC, or the selfregulatory organizations (“SROs”) under the direction of the SEC, to
adopt rules “reasonably designed to address conflicts of interest that
can arise when securities analysts recommend equity securities in
61
research reports and public appearances.” One important objective
of this statutory mandate is for rules to eliminate certain pressures on
securities analysts from investment bankers that tend to compromise
the objectivity of the analyst’s work. Another important goal is for
rules to provide disclosure to investors of certain conflicts of interest
that could also influence the objectivity of the analyst in preparing a
research report. Senator Sarbanes summarized these problems
succinctly in the debates preceding the enactment of the statute
which bears his name.
[I]f you are an investor and an analyst is making a
recommendation and he puts up front in his analysis that he owns
the company stock, or that he is receiving compensation from the
company, or that his firm has a client relationship with the
company, or that he is receiving compensation based on
investment banking revenues received from the company,
someone is going to look at this and say: wait a second. I have to
62
take his recommendation in the context of his involvement.

The text of the statute is silent with respect to implied private
actions, and there is no parroting of 10b-5 language as we see below
63
with respect to officers’ certifications and Regulation G. Securities
64
65
Act Release No. 8193, which adopted Regulation AC pursuant to

59
60
61
62
63
64

Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, supra note 55, at 86,986 (footnotes omitted).
17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500-.505 (2003).
15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (2003).
148 CONG. REC. S6333 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
17 C.F.R. §§ 244.100-.102 (2003).
Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8193, [2002-
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the authority granted in section 501, appears somewhat ambiguous
with respect to implied private actions under Regulation AC.
I. Regulation AC and Fraud Liability Under Federal
Securities Laws
Several commenters requested that the Commission
reiterate the position stated in the Proposing Release that
Regulation AC does not impose new liability on analysts or their
66
firms.[ ] Regulation AC formalizes and potentially adds rigor to
analysts’ responsibilities to express their views truthfully and
67
without guile.[ ]
Regulation AC makes explicit the
representations that are already implicit when an analyst
publishes his or her views—that the analysis of a security
published by the analyst reflects the analyst’s honestly held
68
views.[ ]
Regulation AC does not alter any other existing obligation
under the federal securities laws for research analysts or broker69
dealers.[ ]
A research report contains an inherent
representation that the views expressed in the report are not
knowingly false and do not omit material facts necessary in order
70
to make statements made not misleading.[ ]
Thus, even without Regulation AC, analysts may be found to
have violated the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws if they make baseless recommendations or recommendations

2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,833, at 87,233 (Feb. 20, 2003).
65
17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500-.505 (2003).
66
Regulation Analyst Certification, supra note 64, at 87,241-42 n.52 (listing
examples).
67
Id. at 87,242 n.53 (stating that “[a]s the Commission stated in the Proposing
Release, Regulation AC is not intended to create new duties under Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act. As a result, no private liability will arise from a broker, dealer, or
associated person’s failure to make the required disclosure, or make, keep, and
maintain required records. However, Regulation AC is subject to the full range of
the Commission’s enforcement authority. With regard to the enforcement of
Regulation AC by the SROs, nothing in Regulation AC is inconsistent with Exchange
Act Rule 19g2-1,” and citing 17 C.F.R. 240.19g2-1).
68
Id. n.54 (stating “[t]he use of a certification process echoes and is consistent
with one approach employed in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires
certifications by officers of corporations relating to issuers’ financial statements,” and
citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 302, 906, 116 Stat. 746,
777-78, 806 (2002)).
69
Id. n.55 (citing, as examples, Securities Act § 17(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. 77q;
Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b); and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
240.10b-5).
70
Id. n.56 (citing, as examples, Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a);
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5; Exchange Act § 15(c)(1)(A), 15
U.S.C. 78o(c)(1)(A); and Exchange Act Rule 15c1-2(b), 17 C.F.R. 240.15c1-2).
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71

The SROs have been issuing rules with respect to research analysts’
certifications that, to some extent, are inextricably intertwined with
the text of section 501 of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC rules
72
promulgated thereunder. Query as to whether private actions may
73
be implied based upon violations of these SRO rules.
IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS BASED UPON CERTIFICATIONS
OF FINANCIAL REPORTS
We have examined the safe harbors created by the SEC from
implied private actions under certain provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley
for lawyers, audit committee financial experts, and with respect to offbalance sheet transactions. We have seen the SEC straddle the issue
of implied private actions based upon analysts’ certifications. In
contrast to these positions, the Commission has promulgated releases
which support implied private actions under provisions of SarbanesOxley with respect to officers’ certifications, Regulation G, which
covers pro forma financial statements, and accountants’ retention of
audit records. We now address these releases.
Section 302(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley requires chief executive
officers and chief financial officers personally to certify certain
financial representations of their companies.
Section 302. CORPORATE
FINANCIAL REPORTS.

RESPONSIBILITY

FOR

(a) REGULATIONS REQUIRED.—The Commission shall,
by rule, require, for each company filing periodic reports under
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78m, 78o(d)), that the principal executive officer or
officers and the principal financial officer or officers, or persons
performing similar functions, certify in each annual or quarterly
report filed or submitted under either such section of such Act
that—
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report;
(2) based on the officer’s knowledge, the report does
71

Id. at 87,242 & n.57 (citing Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908 (May
10, 2002); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-46301 (Aug. 2, 2002) (Proposing
Release); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969); In re Robertson Stephens,
Inc., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11003 (Jan. 9, 2003)).
72
See SEC Approval of SRO Analyst Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908,
[2001-2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,639, at 85,457 (May 10,
2002).
73
For an extended discussion with respect to this issue, see 6 BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS, supra note 8, §§ 13:62 to :72.
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not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading;
(3) based on such officer’s knowledge, the financial
statements, and other financial information included in the
report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the
periods presented in the report;
(4) the signing officers—
(A) are responsible for establishing and maintaining
internal controls;
(B) have designed such internal controls to ensure
that material information relating to the issuer and its
consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such officers by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which the
periodic reports are being prepared;
(C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s
internal controls as of a date within 90 days prior to the report;
and
(D) have presented in the report their conclusions
about the effectiveness of their internal controls based on their
evaluation as of that date;
(5) the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer’s
auditors and the audit committee of the board of directors (or
persons fulfilling the equivalent function)—
(A) all significant deficiencies in the design or
operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the
issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial
data and have identified for the issuer’s auditors any material
weaknesses in internal controls; and
(B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in
the issuer’s internal controls; and
(6) the signing officers have indicated in the report
whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls
or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of their evaluation, including any
corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and
74
material weaknesses.

74

15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2003).
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While the language of 302(a) does not expressly authorize
private actions, that language does parrot the text of SEA section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, provisions which have engendered literally
thousands of implied private actions during the past fifty years.
75
Moreover, Securities Act Release No. 8124, which promulgated rules
as directed by 302(a), offers a roadmap for the express and implied
private actions which can be sustained based upon violations of the
duties and obligations created by 302(a).
6. Liability for False Certification
An issuer’s principal executive and financial officers already
are responsible as signatories for the issuer’s disclosures under
76
the Exchange Act liability provisions[ ] and can be liable for
material misstatements or omissions under general antifraud
77
standards[ ] and under our authority to seek redress against
78
those who cause or aid or abet securities law violations.[ ] An
officer providing a false certification potentially could be subject
to Commission action for violating Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Exchange Act and to both Commission and private actions for
violating Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act
79
Rule 10b-5.

IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER REGULATION G
Section 401(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes rules with respect
to the proper presentation of pro forma financial information,
stating:
(b) COMMISSION RULES ON PRO FORMA FIGURES.—
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Commission shall issue final rules

75

Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports,
Securities Act Release No. 33-8124, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 86,720, at 86,125 (Aug. 28, 2002).
76
Id. at 86,133 n.66 (citing sections 13(a) and 18 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(a), 78r).
77
Id. n.67 (citing Howard v. Everex Systems, Inc., 228 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000), for
the proposition that “a corporate officer who signs a Commission filing containing
representations ‘makes’ the statement in the filing and can be liable as a primary
violator of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act”).
78
Id. n.68 (citing sections 20, 21, 21C and 21D of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§78t, 78u, 78u-3, 78u-4).
79
Id. at 86,133 & n.70 (footnote omitted) (noting that “[a] false certification also
may have liability consequences under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act
[15 U.S.C. §§ 77k and 77l(a)(2)] where a quarterly or annual report is incorporated
by reference into a registration statement on Form S-3 [17 CFR 239.13] or F-3 [17
CFR 239.33] or into a prospectus filed pursuant to Securities Act Rule 424(b) [17
CFR 230.424(b)]”).
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providing that pro forma financial information included in any
periodic or other report filed with the Commission pursuant to
the securities laws, or in any public disclosure or press or other
release, shall be presented in a manner that—
(1) does not contain an untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
pro forma financial information, in light of the circumstances
under which it is presented, not misleading; and
(2) reconciles it with the financial condition and results
of operations of the issuer under generally accepted accounting
80
principles.

Here again, as with respect to officers’ certifications discussed
above, the statutory language does not expressly authorize private
actions. The statutory language does, however, track the language of
SEA section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 which have been the basis for
thousands of implied private actions during the past half century.
81
Moreover, Securities Act Release No. 8176, which adopted
82
Regulation G as directed by 401(b), is quite explicit in stating that a
violation of Regulation G may give rise to a violation of 10b-5 “if all
the elements for such a violation are present”:
4. Liability matters
Rule 102 of Regulation G expressly provides that neither the
requirements of Regulation G nor a person’s compliance or noncompliance with the requirements of Regulation G shall in itself
affect any person’s liability under Exchange Act Section 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5 thereunder. Disclosure pursuant to Regulation G that
is materially deficient may, in addition to violating Regulation G,
give rise to a violation of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 thereunder
if all the elements for such a violation are present. In this regard,
we reminded companies in December 2001 that, under certain
circumstances, non-GAAP financial measures could mislead
investors if they obscure the company’s GAAP results. We
continue to be of the view that some disclosures of non-GAAP
83
financial measures could give rise to actions under Rule 10b-5.[ ]
Section 3(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides that a

80

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2003).
Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act Release
No. 33-8176, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,816, at
86,830 (Jan. 2, 2003).
82
17 C.F.R. §§ 244.100-.102 (2003).
83
Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, supra note 81, at 86,836
n.36 (citing Financial Reporting, Release No. 33-8039 (Dec. 4, 2001); In re Trump
Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc., Release No. 34-45287 (Jan. 16, 2002)).
81
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violation of that Act or the Commission’s rules thereunder shall
be treated for all purposes as a violation of the Exchange Act.
Therefore, if an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, fails to
comply with Regulation G, the issuer and/or the person acting on
its behalf could be subject to a Commission enforcement action
alleging violations of Regulation G. Additionally, if the facts and
circumstances warrant, we could bring an action under both
84
Regulation G and Rule 10b-5.

ACCOUNTANTS’ RETENTION OF AUDIT RECORDS
We noted above that section 104(g)(3) of Sarbanes-Oxley
mandates confidentiality regarding certain findings made by the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as a result of its
inspections of accounting firms.
We noted further that this
confidentiality requirement would adversely impact the prosecution
of implied private actions because it would deprive plaintiffs’ lawyers
of crucial ammunition for their lawsuits.
By contrast, section 802(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley supports implied
private actions by mandating that accountants who audit a public
company’s financial statements “shall maintain all audit or review
workpapers for a period of 5 years from the end of the fiscal period
85
in which the audit or review was concluded.”
The statute also
provides:
The Securities and Exchange Commission shall promulgate,
within 180 days, after adequate notice and an opportunity for
comment, such rules and regulations, as are reasonably necessary,
relating to the retention of relevant records such as workpapers,
documents that form the basis of an audit or review, memoranda,
correspondence, communications, other documents, and records
(including electronic records) which are created, sent, or
received in connection with an audit or review and contain
conclusions, opinions, analyses, or financial data relating to such
an audit or review, which is conducted by any accountant who
86
conducts an audit of an issuer of securities . . . .

The Commission’s rules promulgated pursuant to section 802
extend the record retention period from five to seven years.
Moreover, the Commission’s Release pursuant to section 802 is quite
clear in articulating the benefits the new record retention rules will
provide for private litigants.

84
85
86

Id. at 86,836.
18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1) (2003).
Id. § 1520(a)(2).
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Rule 2-06 [of Regulation S-X] requires that accountants
retain certain records relevant to an audit or review of an issuer’s
or registered investment company’s financial statements for seven
years. To the extent that the rule increases the availability of
documents beyond current professional practices, the rule may
benefit investigations and litigation conducted by the Commission
and others. Increased retention of these records will preserve
evidence reflecting significant accounting judgments and may
provide important evidence of financial reporting improprieties
87
or deficiencies in the audit process.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there are a number of points worth noting. First,
the text and the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley do not support
implied private actions under that statute. Rather, it is the SEC rules
and releases promulgated pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley that are the
main source of support for such implied private actions. Second,
these SEC rules and releases, while supportive of implied private
actions under Sarbanes-Oxley, are supportive of such actions within
the framework of existing implied private actions, primarily 10b-5.
There is no support articulated in these SEC rules and releases for
implied private actions based solely upon the new obligations and
duties created by Sarbanes-Oxley. Third, the implied private actions
that the SEC supports under Sarbanes-Oxley are the kinds of actions
one would expect the SEC to support—to wit: actions based on false
and misleading officers’ certifications, false and misleading pro forma
financial statements, and baseless analysts’ recommendations. There
is nothing revolutionary here. That being said, however, meaningful
additional obligations and duties have been created by SarbanesOxley, and these additional duties and obligations will provide fuel
for new implied private actions within the framework of existing antifraud provisions. Fourth, one of the most interesting questions with
respect to implied private actions under Sarbanes-Oxley is whether
the courts will imply private actions under the self-regulatory (“SRO”)
rules presently being issued under that statute. These SRO rules,
which address such matters as audit committee independence and
analyst certifications, are being issued either in lieu of, or in
conjunction with, SEC rules, and in many cases are inextricably
intertwined with SEC rules. Under the language and policies

87

Audit Record Retention, Securities Act Release No. 33-8180, [2002-2003
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,819, at 86,927 (Jan. 24, 2003).
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articulated by such authorities as Colonial Realty Corp v. Bache & Co.,
89
and Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., these new
SRO rules may well provide a basis for new implied private actions.
As a fifth consideration, it will be interesting to see how the
lower federal courts respond to implied private actions under
Sarbanes-Oxley. The Supreme Court is presently embedded in the
90
Contraction Era. The lower federal courts, however, have usually
been more expansive with respect to implied private actions than the
Supreme Court, and there is always the possibility of a change of
personnel on the High Court. Sixth, no matter what the Supreme
Court eventually decides, however, implied private actions under
Sarbanes-Oxley will have a settlement value, often substantial, as they
slowly wend their way up the federal appellate ladder.
Finally, the most receptive fora for implied private actions based
upon Sarbanes-Oxley may well be the NASD and New York Stock
Exchange arbitration panels, which hear and decide almost all
customer actions against brokerage firms. Here, the interweaving of
the new duties and obligations created by Sarbanes-Oxley with the
existing anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, state legal
provisions sanctioning fraud and negligence, and the sweeping
ethical standards contained in SRO rules mandating that brokers
adhere to high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade, may prove very effective for plaintiffs, particularly
in fora more receptive to equitable arguments than to strict legal
contentions.

88

358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
What emerges is that whether the courts are to imply federal civil
liability for violation of exchange or dealer association rules by a
member cannot be determined on the simplistic all-or-nothing basis
urged by the two parties; rather, the court must look to the nature of
the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme, with the
party urging the implication of a federal liability carrying a
considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when the violation is
of the statute or an SEC regulation. The case for implication would be
strongest when the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the
common law.
Id. at 182; see also 6 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 8, § 13:64.
89
410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969) (“The touchstone for
determining whether or not the violation of a particular rule is actionable should
properly depend upon its design ‘for the direct protection of investors.’”) (quoting
Lewis D. Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 12, 29 (1966)); see also 6 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 8, § 13:65.
90
See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164
(1994); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 566 (1979).

